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Iran-contra Affair: Summary Of Events, Aug. 9-19
by Deborah Tyroler
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Aug. 9: Independent counsel Lawrence E. Walsh said that neither the "popularity" nor good
intentions of those involved in the Iran-contra affair will be a factor in deciding whether to bring
criminal charges against them. In his first public remarks since the end of congressional hearings,
Walsh clearly was referring to Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, who ran the Iran-contra operations while
he was a National Security Council aide. According to polls, North's popularity soared after
his testimony last month before the congressional panels investigating the sales of arms to Iran
and diversion of profits to aid the Nicaraguan rebels. Walsh said congressional grants of limited
immunity to "central figures" in the affair such as North and former national security adviser John
M. Poindexter have posed "the most serious external threat" to his investigation. But, he said,
"We think we have met it, and we intend to go ahead." In a news conference after his speech to
the American Bar Association meeting, Walsh declined to comment on suggestions that President
Reagan grant pardons to North or others involved in the Iran-contra affair. Although Walsh and
almost all the members of his staff have been carefully shielded from being "tainted" by seeing
or reading about the testimony of immunized witnesses, Walsh said he was not able to escape
the impression that North was a popular witness. Although Walsh argued strenuously against
grants of immunity to witnesses such as North and Poindexter, he said those decisions were a
legitimate "political judgment" by Congress, which had "to move quickly" in getting out the story
of the Iran-contra affair. He said he is confident that if immunized witnesses are prosecuted, "such
persons will not be able to escape criminal responsibility on the basis of the congressional grants
of immunity." To prosecute successfully individuals who have been granted "use immunity" by
Congress, Walsh's office must prove that its case was not based on the immunized testimony
or any leads derived from it. Walsh also rejected arguments that it would be unfair to prosecute
witnesses who had been compelled to testify under grants of immunity. Aug. 14: The official who
headed the US humanitarian aid program for the contras said that he twice ordered his planes
to shuttle weapons for the contras in Central America at the direction of Asst. Secretary of State
Elliott Abrams. The shipments involved weapons the contras had stockpiled in the region that
needed to be transported to their troops, said the official, Robert Duemling, former head of the State
Department's Nicaraguan humanitarian assistance office. He said the flight took place early in 1986,
when the government was giving non-military assistance to the contras but when a congressional
ban on military aid was in effect. The office was in charge of buying and delivering such goods as
food and non-military supplies. Duemling said that none of the money was spent to buy weapons,
but that it was decided that weapons owned by the contras could be ferried by the aid planes in
some cases. He said he was directed by Abrams to fly "mixed loads" after the administration "policy
people" consulted extensively with the congressional intelligence committees as to whether that
would be permitted. He said he sat in on at least one such meeting and that the committees did
not veto the idea as far as he knew. Duemling said he got "policy guidance" from Abrams that
"did permit a degree of latitude" with the flights. But he said he and Abrams agreed that because
the loads would be politically controversial, "It was only something we would have to do if sorely
pressed, not something we would do as a first choice." Aug. 16: Asst. Secretary of State Elliott
Abrams defended his role in authorizing the shipment of weapons on a humanitarian flight to the
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contras, saying the operation was "strictly by the book." Abrams spoke at a news conference in
Fort Meyers, Fla., in response to statements by Robert Duemling who said he had twice ordered
planes to shuttle weapons for the contras on aid planes at Abram's direction in early 1986. Aug. 19:
Senior US officials approved a plan in early 1984, under which the contras would receive training
and equipment that would have been paid for by South Africa, according to government officials.
Among those approving the plan were Secretary of State George Shultz and former CIA Director
William Casey. The declassified documents were made public by the Iran-contra committees on
Aug. 19. Officials said the plan was dropped after a controversy over the mining of Nicaraguan
harbors. The disclosure illustrates the depth of the administration's commitment to the contras.
South Africa's policy of apartheid and its human rights record would have embarrassed the US had
the deal become known. When the administration sought aid for the contras from third countries in
1985, it explicitly ruled out any country with human rights problems or those dependent on US aid
out of fears of adverse publicity. The documents, with the name of the country blanked out, were
made public along with testimony by Dewey R. Clarridge, a CIA official who in 1984 was directing
the agency's covert support for the contras. He testified two weeks ago in closed session. This was
Clarridge's second appearance before the panel. In his first deposition, he was asked whether he
was aware "of any discussions in the agency about soliciting aid from third countries." He said "no."
He was later, in that same session asked "were there any discussion in the CIA about soliciting aid
from third countries," and again replied "no." On Aug. 4, he was asked whether he would like to
change his repsonse. He said: "Yes, I would. Based on a review of the cable traffic prior to my going
out but I think that cable traffic also needs to be clarified because I'm not so sure the answer was
soliciting, my reading of that cable traffic is that at least the agency thought something was being
offered." One former government official said that the plan was part of a negotiation in which the
CIA would send intelligence to South Africa to be used by the Angolan rebels. At the time, US law
barred the government from assisting the Angolan rebels, but there was nothing to prevent South
Africans from passing sensitive military information to the Angolans on its own. This issue was
not raised with Clarridge by the panel. In February 1985 Eden Pastora received 200,000 pounds
of equipment from the South Africans. It is not clear how this shipment was arranged, although
the CIA has told the panel it had no role in it. Clarridge insisted in his testimony that discussion
of a South African offer to aid the contras was based on a misunderstanding by the CIA. He said
his conversations with South African officials led him to conclude there had never been an offer.
Dealings with South Africa began in January, 1984, when Casey met with a South African official.
Clarridge was brought to the meeting to brief this official on Central America. An April 1984 cable
quotes John McMahon, then the deputy director of the CIA, as saying "there are some second
thoughts around town as to the wisdom" of involving South Africa "in the already complicated C.A.
equation." Nonetheless, Clarridge traveled to South Africa in April. But he insisted that he did not
solicit aid for the contras, and that he had been instructed to reject any such offer, were one made.
He said this decision was made after Casey consulted with Shultz. In his visit he learned that the
South African offer was to provide the aid to a third country which would in turn train or assist
the contras. But the South Africans expected reimbursement. He said the decision against South
African aid came after the "hullabaloo" over the mining of the harbors. "The administration could
not be seen as being beholden to the South Africans in any way," he said. Clarridge repeatedly
contradicted the sworn testimony and notebook of North. He said that he had not reviewed aspects
of the Iran operation, as sworn by North. He also said he could not explain why North had written
in his notebook on Oct. 28, 1985, that agency o8ficials feared the CIA's role in shipping arms to Iran
was "criminal." North's notes, which refer to events of November 1985 were released for the first
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time Aug. 19. Clarridge frequently said during his testimony that he could not recall key events in
the Iran affair. Sen. William Cohen, (R-Maine), said: "On practically every single major event that
we have been considering, you have virtually no memory at all, and whenever a question is directed
toward you, you indicate, well, it may be, I just can't recall." (Basic data from several reports by
WASHINGTON POST, NEW YORK TIMES)

-- End --
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